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Priority, Rescue and its Financing in the Commonwealth Caribbean – 
Lessons from United States, United Kingdom and the European Union* 
 
Key words: Rescue, EU State Aid Regime, Super-priority finance 
 
Abstract  
Now the dust of the global financial crisis is settling and extensive corporate failure has been 
exposed, the development of ‘rescue cultures’ continues to be a desired goal. This paper 
investigates the operation of the rescue culture in the Commonwealth Caribbean compared to 
United Kingdom (UK) administration and United States (US) Chapter 11 with special 
emphasis on priority accorded to post-petition financing. This paper confirms the existence of 
the rescue culture in the US, UK and Commonwealth Caribbean but laments that the two 
latter states fail to consider key issues of priority for post-petition finance. It also delves into 
a critical, but often overlooked, pillar of strong rescue frameworks: rescue financing. Taking 
guidance from the European Union framework on State Aid, UK schemes of Funding for 
Lending Scheme and National Loan Guarantee, the author proposes a fair, transparent and 
efficient framework encompassing state involvement and state–driven private sector 
engagement. 
 
  
Introduction  
In the late summer of 2007, ‘hurricane force’ winds blasted the financial 
sector of the great United States of America. Within a year, most of the world’s 
interconnected financial systems were demolished by a global tornado, now 
coined the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (GFC). In the wake of the crisis, a ‘national 
lockdown’ was instituted and protectionism was evident when states placed 
undivided focus on their affairs and were increasingly disinterested in the 
survival of other nations1. This catastrophic event resulted in significant 
economic regions searching for the remnants of their financial systems, 
questioning the role of the state and the nature of its financial regulations and 
                                                        
* Lana Ashby, LL.B. (UWI), LL.M (Cantab). Lecturer at University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, 
Barbados. I am grateful for the reviews on the drafts of this paper. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the author and do not represent those of The University of the West Indies. 
1 Lars Oxelheim, Lars Pehrson and Thomas Persson (eds), The European Union and the Global Crisis, 
(Executive Summary, Europaperspektiv, 2010): Solutions to this global problem “were not worked out 
in Brussels but rather in Berlin, London, Paris and Stockholm”; See C. Fred Bergsten, ‘Needed: A Global 
Response to the Global Economic and Financial Crisis’, (Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, April 
2009) <http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/testimony.cfm?ResearchID=1146> accessed June 
28, 2013 
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practices (with a desire to guide reform) and seeking to rebuild citizens’ 
confidence in the ‘market’. Most of all, a critical question was posed: who was 
accountable for this financial meltdown? What is critical is not unanimous 
acceptance of the cause of this earth-shattering calamity [which left millions 
unemployed and homeless2] but rather state-level responses3.  
 
Rising from the ‘ashes’ of corporate failure, it is well accepted that the GFC has 
placed severe pressure on insolvency frameworks and, in some cases, has 
foreshadowed calls for reform or immediate overhaul of current frameworks. 
Having closely scrutinized legislation in the Commonwealth Caribbean4, this 
position applies: it is clear that, in most territories, the drafters have given 
deep consideration and found credible solutions to building a rescue culture, 
but they have failed to consider the more important issue of the financing 
thereof. It is unfathomable that twenty-first century insolvency legislation 
should omit such paramount and modern considerations. It is more ‘bark 
than bite’ and demands urgent reform.  
 
                                                        
2 Impact on unemployment: European Commission: Labour Market Developments 2011: From 2000 – 
2007, unemployment rate in the EU was 8.6 compared with 5.0 in the US. In 2010, unemployment rate 
in both EU and US was 9.6. United States: see US Department of Treasury Report: The Financial Crisis 
Response - In Charts (April 2012) reported that 8.8 million jobs lost and $19.2 trillion in household 
wealth lost <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf> Last accessed June 18, 2013 
3 Rescue financing is not limited to state-implemented measures; however, this paper’s focus is state 
action which facilitates, encourages and ‘rewards’ private sector involvement in corporate rescue. 
4 Commonwealth Caribbean Insolvency/Bankruptcy Law: Anguilla: Bankruptcy Act 2000; Antigua and 
Barbuda: Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 41); Barbados: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2002; Bahamas: 
Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 69); Belize: Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 244); Dominica: Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 9:90); 
Grenada: Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 27); Guyana: Insolvency Act (Cap 12:21); Jamaica: Bankruptcy Act; 
Montserrat: Bankruptcy Act (Cap 9); St Christopher and Nevis: Bankruptcy Act (Cap 9); St Lucia: 
Commercial Code (Cap 244) [Title 9 - Articles 543 – 627]; St Vincent and Grenadines: Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act 2007 (Cap. 136); Trinidad and Tobago: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2007 [not yet 
proclaimed] 
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The ambit of this paper is the mechanisms through which state assistance, 
whether directly or indirectly, may be given to troubled companies. 
Establishing three crucial pillars must necessarily precede this: 
I. Corporate failure [Reality and Nature] 
II. Corporate rescue [Meaning, Importance and Types] 
III. Rescue culture [United States, United Kingdom and Commonwealth 
Caribbean] 
Then, an extensive proposal on state rescue financing will consider both 
financial and non-financial measures. This includes a critical analysis of the 
state aid regime in the European Union5, with emphasis on the framework for 
rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty in the non-banking sector. 
Analysis of recent data on the approval of such schemes is evidence of its 
relevance in the post-financial crisis era. Though this regime is progressive, it 
would be unwise to transplant it to the Commonwealth Caribbean without 
regard to the peculiarities of regional jurisprudence. The ultimate lesson to be 
learnt is the pivotal role that states may play in assisting troubled enterprises 
both directly (state assistance) and indirectly (through smoothing the path 
for assistance by the private sector). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Articles 107 - 109 
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I. Corporate Failure [Reality and Nature] 
 
Corporate Failure: A Myth?  
Corporate failure, and by extension, financial crisis are not uncommon; 
however, the events of 2007 – 8 require scrutiny in light of their global 
dimension. Due to the interconnectedness of their markets, the economies of 
the United States and the European Union were severely affected6. In the 
European Union, the crisis affected those Members States (MS) with large and 
open financial sectors, strong export-orientation, large, specialised 
manufacturing sectors, housing market bubbles, large debts in foreign 
nominated currency and larger current account deficits.7 EU-wide 
unemployment was approximately 7% in 2008 and continues to rise8. 
Similarly in the US, the uncertainty created by failure of the stock market also 
resulted in a rise in unemployment. Across advanced economies [which 
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United 
States], increases in public debt of 25.1% of GDP and output losses of 4.7% of 
GDP were recorded.9 The impact on developing countries, in particular, 
Commonwealth Caribbean, was directly linked to their dependence on foreign 
                                                        
6 Commission, ‘Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses’, European Economy 
7/2009: Four key events led to the collapse of major US and EU financial institutions: (i) bursting of 
property bubble in the United States and the ensuing contamination of balance sheets of global financial 
institutions,  (ii) uncertainty in the financial world caused by the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, 
(iii) the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and (iv) fears about the future of insurance giant: AIG; For a 
chronology of the main events which led to the GFC: page 9 
7 Dennis J. Snower, ‘The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Europe and Europe’s responses’  (Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy) 
<http://www.bruegel.org/fileadmin/bruegel_files/Research_contributions/AEEF_contributions/Crisis_
Developments_and_Long-Term_Global_Response/AEEF4PPDenisJ.Snower.pdf> Accessed May 30, 2013 
8 L. Dugleana and C. Duguleana, ‘European State Aids in the Current Financial Crisis’ Bulletin of the 
Transilvania University of Braşov 2010 Vol. 3 (52) 385, 387 
9 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘The Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly’, 
(2012) International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 10/146 
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investment and cash inflows from and exports to those economies10. This real 
crisis demands real solutions. 
 
 Nature of Corporate Failure 
Having drawn from US and EU experience on the reality of corporate failure, 
an understanding of the definition and the reasons for failure are 
fundamental to any corporate rescue discussion. Intertwined with the success 
of business is the high probability that risk taking will lead to crisis, and 
ultimately, failure11 - thus, the corporate life span is said to be dependent on 
the ‘survival of the fittest’12. Often a company is described as ‘troubled’ or 
‘failing’ but these generic terms give no insight into the stage of decline or 
regeneration facing the company.13 Pretorius notes that the world economic 
crisis in 2008 has created an outcry for a better understanding of the ‘failure 
domain’. He highlights that the literature offers three possible foci relative to 
defining failure: decline focussed definitions, failure focused definitions and 
turnaround focussed definitions. For the purposes of this paper, a ‘failure 
focussed definition’ will be utilized, namely, that posited by Richardson et 
                                                        
10 Bruno Gurtner, ‘The Financial and Economic Crisis and Developing Countries’, 2010 Annual Review of 
International Development Policy – Issue 1, 189: GFC resulted in a rising debt burden on states: in 2008, 
according to the IMF, the total debt burden of all the developing countries mounted by a further USD 
220 billion to a total of USD 4,429 billion and will, according to predictions, continue to rise in coming 
years; See also Abreu et al, ‘The Effect of the World Financial Crisis on Developing Countries: An Initial 
Assessment’, 2009 <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2009/9/effect-world-financial-crisis-
developing-countries-initial-assessment>, last accessed July 4, 2013  
11 Michelle J White, ‘The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3 
No. 2 (Spring 1989) 129 
12 Marius Pretorius, ‘Defining business decline, failure and turnaround: a content analysis’ SAJESBM NS 
Volume 2 (2009) Issue 1, 1: ‘Survival of the fittest’ is compared to organisational ecology where the 
environment will naturally weed out unfit organisations and that the ability to survive over time is a 
function of both an organisation’s suitability to the current environment and its ability to adapt 
appropriately if the environment evolves. 
13 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 145 
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al14: those organisations that will become insolvent15 unless appropriate 
management actions are taken to affect a turnaround in financial 
performance. 
 
Consideration must also be made of the reasons underpinning corporate 
failure: according to Lingard, “[B]efore attempting to rescue any business, the 
cause of its difficulties should be analysed and no rescue will succeed unless 
they are remedied.16” Thomas Carlyle is oft remembered for saying “ 'you 
must empty-out the bathing-tub, but not the baby along with it.' Fling-out 
your dirty water with all zeal, and set it careening down the kennels; but try if 
you can keep the little child!” Similarly, a proper assessment of the reasons 
underlying failure must be deduced before any action is taken. Then, one 
must ‘fling-out’ (fix) the root cause of the insolvency but save the business or 
company if possible. Since the size, nature, industry of the business (among 
other things) influences this determination, there is no conclusive list of 
‘reasons for failure’; rather, these reasons should be properly termed 
contributing factors.17 
 
                                                        
14 Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson ‘Understanding the causes of business failure crisis: generic 
failure types: boiled frogs, drowned frogs, bullfrogs and tadpoles’ Management Decision, (2004) 32(4): 
9  
15 R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals, ‘Understanding Insolvency’ (October 2008): 
There is a standard definition of insolvency: A company is insolvent either on a cash flow basis (unable 
to pay its debts as they fall due) or balance sheet basis (value of its assets is less than the sum of its 
liabilities) 
16 J. R. Lingard, Corporate Rescues and Insolvencies, (first published 1986, Butterworths 1989) 3 
17 Robert N. Lussier, ‘The Reasons Why Small Businesses Fail and How to Avoid Failure’, The 
Entrepreneurial Executive, Fall 1996, Volume 1, Number 2, 10 - 13 
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Contributing factors may be grouped into internal and external factors18. 
Internal factors include (a) poor management – this encompasses indecisive 
management19, production and marketing errors (inadequate market 
research) and accounting problems: inadequate, inaccurate or non-existent 
books and records; (b) financial factors: liquidity problems, current asset 
cover or external debt dependence and (c) fraud. External factors20 include 
government policy, overseas competition, insolvency of a major competitor, 
market changes and calamities such as natural disaster, terrorist activities or 
legal liabilities. Apart from these, some companies fail due to an inability to 
recognise the signs of impending failure21. 
 
Given the inclusion of poor management as a contributing factor, the link 
between corporate governance and corporate failure (and, by extension, the 
GFC) is often raised: does good corporate governance equal success? 
Ultimately, the literature is inconclusive22. Though this analysis is outside the 
scope of this paper, it is not disputed that poor or relaxed corporate 
                                                        
18 Examples of contributing factors in specific companies: ENRON and World-Com (fraud); Kodak (loss 
of competitive edge); Poor industrial relations (Aer Lingus Plc); Loss of customer/marketplace focus 
(IBM); Unsuccessful mergers/acquisitions (Baltimore Securities); Research and development failure 
(Elan Corporation); Loosening regulations (Lehman Brothers) 
19 Nick Hood, ‘Is insolvency pre-destined and can it be predicted?’ (2012) 2 CRI 48: Reference made to 
Blacks (UK): Action was only taken when the company was in the ‘red zone’ for over three years 
20 On government policy: This may include increased taxation, financial controls or withdrawal of 
financial aid – Railtrack Group plc anticipated state subsidies in 2001 which were not forthcoming 
which resulted in this subsidiary being out in administration under the Railway Act 1993 – see Finch 
page; On overseas competition: Small business: Causes of bankruptcy – Don Bradley – in citing research 
from  a 1998 paper ‘Financial Difficulties of Small Business and Reasons for Their Failure’ – over 39% of 
companies failed due to outside business conditions which include increase in outside competition 
21 See also R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals, Business Wave Index 1, November 2010 - 
Signs of distress include decreased profits, reduction in trading volume, pay cuts, use of maximum 
overdraft facility, difficulty in paying bills on time, selling assets to pay off debts 
22 See Froud et al [‘Everything for Sale’ (2008) 56 Sociological Rev. 162, 165-66]: No clear evidence that 
corporate performance improved when companies acquired more NEDs with clearer responsibilities. 
See also Daily and Dalton [‘Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board Composition 
and Structure’, Academy of Management Journal (1994) Vol 37, No. 6, 1603 - 1617]: Structural 
independence does not equal performance advantage; Melvin and Hirt, [“Corporate Governance…” in 
Rushton (ed.), Business Case… (2008), 201, 204- 209] suggests there is a link between high standards of 
corporate governance and better performance – they also accept that there is competing evidence 
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governance practices may have played some role in the GFC23 but it cannot be 
identified as the sole or root cause of the crisis24. 
 
II. Corporate rescue  
Corporate rescue may be defined as major intervention necessary to avert 
eventual failure of the company or drastic action at a time of crisis25 or even 
survival of the company or a substantial part of its business.26 The definition 
adopted for corporate rescue is key as it is directly connected to determining 
the appropriate time for intervention and measuring rescue success. This 
paper is guided by the first definition. Before considering its benefits, two 
observations are worth making: (i) ‘Not all lame ducks can, or should be 
rescued and the appropriate procedure for the genuinely doomed is 
liquidation’; rescue is not a right27. Rescue and any accompanying finance 
should be reserved for those that are, according to the Cork Committee 
                                                        
23 Roman Tomasic, ‘Raising corporate governance standards in response to corporate rescue and 
insolvency’  (2009) 1 CRI 5: A recent report by the International Corporate Governance Network 
('ICGN') has found that poor corporate governance has been a significant cause of the current financial 
crisis as company boards 'failed to understand and manage risk and tolerated perverse incentives' 
(quoted by P Skypala, 'Time to reward good corporate governance', The Financial Times, 17 November 
2008, at p 6). He also notes that more stringent regulation [corporate governance or otherwise] is often 
triggered by financial distress or collapse: eg 1992 Cadbury Report following the collapse of Maxwell 
and BCCI; Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 after the collapse of ENRON and Banking (Special Provisions) 
Act 2008 
24 See Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The 
Case of the S&P 500’, ECGI Law Working Paper N°. 124/2009; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, ‘Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’; <http://www.unctad-
docs.org/files/CG-in-Wake-of-Fin-Crisis-Ch6.pdf> last accessed July 4, 2013; Simon Deakin ‘Corporate 
Governance and the Financial Crisis in the Long Run’, Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge Working Paper No. 417, 2010; OECD Report, ‘Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis 
– Key Findings and Main Messages’, June 2009; Erkens et al, ‘Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 
Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide’, 2012, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397685>, last accessed July 4, 2013; Jaap Winter, ‘The Financial Crisis: 
Does Good Corporate Governance Matter and How to Achieve it?’, DSF Policy Paper, No. 14, August 
2011 (x) Global Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance Failures and Lessons - Naveen Kumar, J. P. Singh  
25 Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue: A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), 
12 - This narrow definition has been adopted since a broad one (such as avoidance of distress and 
failure) would include all management activity which may be thought of as constant and repeated 
rescue attempts 
26 David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) 3 
27 Sandra Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime’ (2004) 67(2) MLR 247, 248; See also Insolvency Service 
Report [cited in Frisby]: “Corporate rescue mechanisms are not intended to maintain inefficient firms 
that are not economically viable”. 
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Report, “inherently viable”28. (ii) Rescue of business or company? Rescue of a 
business occurs where the company is liquidated and successful steps are 
taken to retain economic or organisational aspects and/or sustain 
employment.29 On the other hand, rescue of a company occurs where the 
company emerges from the rehabilitation intact and continues with the same 
operation often including the same workforce and owners30. This paper 
covers both business and company rescue. 
 
The benefits of corporate rescue are immeasurable – these include 
employment, encouraging entrepreneurship, removal of stigma attached to 
business failure31 and building confidence by saving businesses which have 
sound business plans but were affected by macroeconomic conditions. Brown 
suggests “It must at least be in the interests of the business community as a 
whole that not too many companies fail, because of the effect such statistics 
would have on confidence”32. 
 
Given the benefits of rescue and the possibility of a myriad of results 
[reogranisation33 (eg. managerial reforms instituted), restructuring (eg. 
closure of business elements), refinancing (eg injection of fresh capital), 
downsizing (eg management buyout (MBO)) or taking over (eg business 
bought by leading competitor)], restoration of a company to its healthy state 
                                                        
28 Great Britain Insolvency Law Review Committee: Cork Committee Report: (1982, Cmnd 8558); This is 
one of the lessons gleaned from the Japanese Banking Crisis of 1990s 
29 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 244 
30 Sandra Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime’ (2004) 67(2) MLR 247, 248 – 249  
31 Mike Stevenson, ‘The Enterprise Bill 2002 – a move towards a rescue culture?’ (2002) Vol 18, No 5 
IL&P 155: The rescue culture may operate to remove this stigma associated with honest failures 
32 David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) 2 
33 See Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’ The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(Jan 1986), pp. 127 – 147 
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is a poor lens through which success is measured34. Determining a threshold 
for measuring success is key in determining whether the costs of rescue 
financing can be offset by the benefits. Further, in judging the success of an 
entity’s rescue, one must ensure that ‘zombie’ businesses [‘Are zombies really 
attacking the UK economy?’ – January 2013]35 are not being ‘grouped’ as 
healthy enterprises. 
 
Finch accepts that a key consideration in ensuring success is the time of 
intervention. Evidence suggests that intervention which is not undertaken at 
an early stage or speedy nature is unlikely to achieve the desired ends36. Any 
measurement of success should consider both short-term survival and long-
term sustained economic activity.37 Brown notes that a specific time should 
not be calculated: ‘If a chronically sick patient is kept alive for an additional 
two years, is this medical intervention successful or is it too early to say?’38 
This inherent challenge makes measuring the success of a rescue regime 
messy and difficult.39  
 
                                                        
34 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 243; See also David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (John 
Wiley & Sons, 1996) 2: he notes that a standard for success of return to solvency may be too rigid and 
unrealistic 
35 R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals, ‘Are zombies really attacking the UK economy’ 
(January 2013) Page 3: Defines a zombie business as a company only able to service interest on its debt 
but not on the debt itself. There are four signs of a zombie business: • Just paying the interest on debts 
(and not the debt itself) • Will be unable to repay debts if interest rates rise • Having to negotiate 
payment terms with creditors • Struggling to pay debts as they fall due 
36 R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals Survey of Business Recovery (2001): 77% of 
rescue professionals, by time of appointment, stated that no action could be taken to avert corporate 
failure 
37 Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue: A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 
23; Cited in Belcher: Zimmerman in The Turnaround Experience: Real world Lessons in Revitalizing 
Corporations (1991) p.22: “The endurance of the recovery should be considered in determining whether 
success or failure has been achieved.” 
38 David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) 2 
39 Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue: A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 
24 
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On the face of it, the continuation of the business or company is a desirable 
outcome; however, just below the surface are trade-offs which must be made 
between the interests of key stakeholders including the creditors, debtors, 
employees, shareholders, the government, the customers and wider 
community40. Finch notes some of these: on the one hand, creditors prefer the 
business to be closed with the hope that this action will maximise their 
returns while employees and shareholders prefer the business to remain 
open. On another spectrum, economists will be interested in the efficient 
allocation of resources and wealth-creating uses of money while political 
scientist will be inclined to demand that rescue processes are moulded by 
representative institutions.41 Due to these trade-offs, Belcher views all rescue 
success as ‘partial’.42    
 
The term ‘rescue’ demands a distinction between formal and informal 
rescue43. Formal rescue procedures are considered under Part III where an 
assessment of the rescue cultures of varying jurisdictions. An informal rescue 
is as an agreement on a contractual basis which allows parties to alter their 
                                                        
40 Andrew Keay, ‘Balancing Interests in Bankruptcy Law’, CLWR 30 2 (206) 2 – 9. Note also Legal 
Department of the International Monetary Fund, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures – Key Issues 
(1999): “There are social and political factors that are served by the existence of formal rehabilitation 
provisions and, in particular, the protection of employees of a troubled enterprise. These considerations 
explain why the design of rehabilitation provisions varies from country to country. When countries 
evaluate and reform their insolvency laws, the key question will often be how to find the appropriate 
balance between a variety of social, political, and economic interests that will induce all actors in the 
economy to participate in the system.” 
41 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: the search for quality and capacity to resolve’, (2010) 6 
Journal of Business Law 502, 504 
42 Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue: A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 
22 – 23: It is referred to as partial since loss will be incurred by stakeholders whether it be 
management, employees, shareholders, secured or ordinary creditors, government or the national 
economy  
43 The choice between a formal or informal rescue is often dependent on a number of factors such as the 
scale of financial distress experienced by the company, size of the company, number of debtors, 
whether creditors are sophisticated, the nature of the business which includes the industry and market 
share 
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strict contractual rights.44 One type of bank-driven informal rescue is the 
‘London Approach’45. This may be summarised in three steps: (i) debtor 
informs bank that it is financially distressed; (ii) all or the majority of debtor’s 
creditors (banks)46 adopt an informal ‘standstill’: during this short period of 
time they agree not to enforce their strict legal rights and often pledge 
additional capital which is accorded priority; (iii) committee appointed by 
bank creditors assess the company’s financial position and make a 
determination that it is financially distressed [lead bank negotiates a 
workout] or past recovery [losses in ‘standstill’ are shared pro rata]. 
 
Though well established, the London Approach is waning due to the 
internationalisation and interconnectedness of financial markets – thus, a 
reduction in cooperation between global organisations. However, confidence 
in informal rescue (now termed ‘Informal Workouts’) is evident in the last 
decade, there has been an upsurge in workouts prompted by the development 
                                                        
44 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (first published 2002, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 251 - 253; See David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, 
(Wiley & Sons, 1996), 4: Finch and Brown considered the advantages and disadvantages of informal 
rescue. Advantages: Cost, secrecy, flexibility, no stigma of formal insolvency procedures which 
preserves going concern value, management has knowledge of company remains in control and their 
actions are not scrutinized externally, possibility of enhanced security (advanced priority in 
insolvency). Disadvantages: requires unanimity – creditors pursue numerous goals, no formal 
‘standstill’ (known as ‘moratorium’) – thus any creditor may, without notice, enforce his strict legal 
right, no protection or voice for unsecured creditors, the complexity of informal rescue is amplified by 
the fragmentation of credit markets and the varying class of creditors 
45 Armour and Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The ‘London Approach’ to the 
Resolution of Financial Distress’, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 173 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp173.pdf>, last accessed July 4, 2013; For more on the 
‘London Approach’: see John Flood, ‘Globalisation and Law’ (2002) Law and Social Theory 311; Bank of 
England (BoE) Quarterly Bulletin: ‘The London Approach: distressed debt trading’ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb940208.pdf> last 
accessed July 4, 2013; The Law Society Gazette (23 January 1991); Flood et al, Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) Report: The Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue, Research 
Report 45, 1995 
46  Franks and Sussman, ‘Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Sized 
Enterprises’, Review of Finance (2005) 9 (1): 65-96 notes that such procedures are preferred by banks, 
as a study of 542 UK small and medium sized financially distressed companies, show higher recovery 
rates for banks when compared with other creditors since banks often time liquidation close to the 
point at which the value of the firm is equal to the value of the bank’s collateral 
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of international guides based on the ‘London Approach’. These include the 
INSOL Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor 
Workouts (October 2000), World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (April 2001) and Asian Bankers' 
Association Informal Workout Guidelines – Promoting Corporate 
Restructuring in Asia (October 2005). However, literature discussing the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is limited due to secrecy involved in such 
procedures.  
 
 
III. Rescue Culture [United States, United Kingdom and Commonwealth 
Caribbean (with emphasis on Barbados)] 
 
 What is a Rescue Culture? 
A rescue culture may be defined simply as “a legal and institutional response 
to distress that is geared in the first instance to attempting to save a troubled 
business rather than to close it down and distribute proceeds to creditors as 
quickly as possible.”47 Hunter has offered a more extensive definition: “What 
then [is meant] by the term ‘rescue culture’? It is a multi-aspect concept, 
having both a positive and protective role, and a corrective and a punitive 
role. On one level, it manifests itself by legislative and judicial policies, 
directed to the more benevolent treatment of insolvent persons, whether they 
be individuals or corporations, and at the same time to a more draconian 
treatment of true economic delinquents. On another level, it entails the 
                                                        
47 Armour and Mokal, ‘Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002’, 
(2005) Lloyds’ Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28 
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adoption of a general rule for the construction of statutes, which is 
deliberately inclined towards the giving of a profitable and socially profitable 
meaning (rather than a negative or socially destructive meaning), to statutes 
of socio-economic import. Of such statutes, insolvency legislation may justly 
be regarded as the paramount example.”48 From these definitions, two key 
concepts may be discerned: 
 (a) Multi-faceted response: legal and institutional 
(b) It should be geared towards rescue in the first instance but 
provides for exit from rescue where this is not a feasible objective 
In considering the birth and development of a rescue culture, special 
emphasis is placed on super-priority rescue financing provisions as this gives 
insight into the potential for private-sector driven financing. An extensive 
statement of the rescue culture is beyond the scope of this work and the 
author’s intention is merely to highlight the existence and modus operandi of 
the rescue culture. 
 
 Rescue Culture in the United States  
 
Evidence of a Rescue Culture? 
The US Bankruptcy Code, since the 1970s, has facilitated the continued 
existence of a distressed enterprise as a going concern through rescue under 
Chapter 11. This stands in direct contrast to Chapter 7: liquidation. To enter 
Chapter 11, there is no imposed “insolvency” condition and an immediate stay 
                                                        
48 Hunter in ‘Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’ 1999 Journal of Business Law 491 
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of proceedings is instituted as soon as the petition is filed49. There is no 
removal of management [‘debtor-in-possession’] as they continue to ‘run’ the 
affairs of the company. A US Trustee appoints a committee of creditors, which 
plays a pivotal role in the negotiations between the company, and the 
creditors50. Whilst managing the company, they are given 180 days in smaller 
bankruptcies/300 days in large bankruptcies to formulate a reorganisation 
plan. If the court gives approval of the plan, consent of classes of creditors is 
needed in which dissenting creditors may be “cram down”. This initial court 
approval ensures creditor approval is not given to a plan that would be 
rejected by the court due to unconformity with the requirements of the Code. 
After the consent of the classes is achieved, the court must again approve the 
plan. This ensures that the plan is compliant with the Code and the company 
can meet its reasonable foreseeable expenses. If the court or the creditors 
reject the plan, the stay of proceedings is lifted allowing creditors to enforce 
their claims or the company is put into liquidation under Chapter 7. 
 
Priority for rescue financing? 
Chapter 11 provides priority to rescue finance: 
(i) unsecured credit may be obtained with court consent – it will be treated as 
an administration expense which attract priority before other unsecured 
claims;  
                                                        
49 Bankruptcy Code (US) Chapter 11, section 363 
50 US Chapter 11, sections 1102 – 1103: This Committee has extensive powers which include the hiring 
of external staff to assess the viability of the company’s operations eg financial accountants, lawyers 
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(ii) secured credit – attracting priority over pre-petition unsecured claims by 
treating it as an administration expense but may be prioritised above 
administration expenses if secured on an unencumbered asset; or 
(iii) priming “liens” may give priority over pre-petition secured creditors 
where it can be proven that pre-petition holders are given sufficient 
protection and such priority is the only mechanism through which the funds 
may be accessed.51 
 
Broude suggests that one of the myths that surround Chapter 11 is that 
debtor-in-possession priority financing harms existing secured creditors. This 
is strongly rejected: In the majority of cases, existing lenders continue to lend 
the debtor company ensuring that its collateral does not exceed the value of 
the company. Where the financier of the rescue is a new creditor, the statute 
permits super-priority through lien-priming only if the pre-existing lender is 
sufficiently protected.52 This shows the court’s respect for the existing 
security. 
 
 
Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom  
 
Evidence of a Rescue Culture? 
Inspired by the US Chapter 11, this rescue culture, produced by the 
strengthening of the administration regime and abolition (in part) of the 
                                                        
51 David Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) 763  
52 Richard F Broude, ‘How the rescue culture came to the United States and the myths that surround 
Chapter 11’, (2000) Vol 16, No 5 IL&P 194, 199 
 17 
administrative receivership regime, has received many accolades from the 
judiciary53 and academics. Though Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is the birth 
of the rescue culture54, the changes effected by EA 2002 gave rescue the 
prominence it deserved55. The rescue culture was facilitated by a number of 
key changes: (a) abolition of administrative receivership [retained in 
circumstances relevant to capital markets] under section 250 of Enterprise 
Act 2002 (EA 2002); (b) refashioning of the administration procedure 
including the ability to appoint administrators out-of-court; and (c) abolition 
of Crown preference: section 251 of EA 2002. 
 
The rescue culture is given life on consideration of the policies underpinning 
UK insolvency law: 
(i) Efficiency: Time [1 year limit: para 76(1) Sch B1of IA 1986 but may be 
extended] and Costs: Possibility of employing a pre-packaged 
administration56, provision of electronic communication, remote attendance 
                                                        
53 Powdrill and another v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, 442 (HL) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson): “This 'rescue 
culture' which seeks to preserve viable businesses was and is fundamental to much of the 1986 Act. Its 
significance in the present case is that, given the importance attached to receivers and administrators 
being able to continue to run a business, it is unlikely that Parliament would have intended to produce a 
regime as to employees' rights which renders any attempt at such rescue either extremely hazardous or 
impossible.” See also Re Dairy Farmers of Britain Ltd (Henderson J) [2009] EWHC 1389 (Ch), [10] - “… 
administration is the form of insolvency process now generally favoured by Parliament and the 'rescue 
culture' which it seeks to promote”; In the Matter of Re Nortel GmbH (in administration) and other 
companies and other appeals (Lloyd LJ) [2011] EWCA Civ 1124, [113] – “There is force in the argument 
that the potentially very large liability under an eventual contribution notice, and the open-ended 
nature of the obligation under a financial support direction, could be a serious impediment to the rescue 
culture which underlies the administration regime.” 
54 The Enterprise Bill 2002 – a move towards a rescue culture? Mike Stevenson (2002) Vol 18, NO 5 
IL&P 155 
55 Confirmed by Armour and Hsu, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002’, (2008) European Company and Financial Law Review 5(2), 148 – 171 
56 A pre-packaged administration is defined as an agreement between a company and its creditors made 
between formal entry into administration to sell the company as a going concern as soon as the 
company enters administration. For more on pre-packaged administration, see:  Roy Goode, Principles 
of Corporate Insolvency Law (first published 1990, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 412 – 416, Keay and Walton 
(first published 2003, 2008) 125 - 130; Insolvency Service, ‘Improving the Transparency of, and 
confidence, in, pre-packaged sales in administrations (Consultation/Call for Evidence)’, (March 2010), 
last accessed July 6 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionan
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at meetings, publication on website, passing of resolutions by 
correspondence, dispensing of the initial creditors meetings if it is unlikely 
that a distribution will be given to unsecured creditors 
 
(ii) Transparency: External management and documents filed with the court 
 
(iii) Flexibility: Ability to enter administration out of court, single purpose 
with hierarchy of objectives [this has given significant life to the rescue 
framework since rescuing the company as a going concern is the first possible 
objective57], possible entries to administration58, extension of one year – 
unlimited by court or limited to 6 months extension on creditor application59 
 
(iv) Accountability: Duty to act in the interest of all creditors60, creditor 
voting: administrator must ensure that he reports and provides proposals for 
meeting of creditors in less than 10 weeks 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
dlegislation/con_doc_register/Pre-pack%20consultation%2031march%2010.pdf>; The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales,  ‘Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 - Pre-packaged sales 
in Administration’, last accessed July 6 
<http://www.icaew.com/~/media/Files/Technical/Insolvency/regulations-and-
standards/sips/england/sip-16-e-and-w-pre-packaged-sales-in-administrations.pdf> On the 
effectiveness  and efficiency of pre-packs: Dr Sandra Frisby, ‘A preliminary analysis of pre-packaged 
administrations’ (Report to R3 - Association of  Business Recovery Professionals) 
<http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-
packed_administrations.pdf> last accessed July 6; Jonathan Moules, ‘No new rules on insolvency’ 
(Financial Times, 27 Jan 2012) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/85926c32-4828-11e1-b1b4-
00144feabdc0.html> last accessed July 6; Re Kayeley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Cooke HHJ): the 
court took the opportunity to comment on the practice of administration pre-packaged sales 
57 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para 3 and 3(2) – (4) 
58 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para 10 (court order), para 14 (appointment by a floating charge 
holder) and para 22 (appointment by the company or its directors) 
59 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 76(2)(a): court; Para 76(2)(b): creditors  
60 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 3, 4, 75, 81, 88; Note that the administrator may be under a 
duty of confidentiality: Re Charnley Davies [1990] BCLC 760; administrator accountable when approved 
pre-pack is not in the best interest of all creditors  
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(v) Empowering: Court-role is minimised where administrator is appointed 
out of court and his actions may be shielded by the business judgment rule, 
empowered to do everything that is necessary or expedient for the 
management of the company’s affairs, wide powers given to the administrator 
 
(vi) Certainty: Ordering of claims, objectives and purposes 
 
(vii) Fairness: Moratorium imposed so that the company is given an 
opportunity to plan its affairs for a possible rescue to ensure a better result 
for creditors as a whole, vote by creditors on proposal [secured creditors 
only], external manager must act in the best interest of all creditors and 
should not operate as the agent for a select group 
 
Priority for rescue financing? 
After consultation in 2009, the Government concluded that the need for 
legislative change [inclusion of provisions facilitating super-priority of rescue 
financing] was not apparent, as stakeholders were cautious about the need to 
balance the interests of all parties; in particular, consideration was given to 
the negative impact that such priority would have on behaviour of lending 
institutions61. Further, R3 Association of Business Professional, in their 
response, suggested two reasons for retaining the status quo: high priority of 
expenses incurred in administrator under rule 2.67 and the absence of a clear 
definition of rescue finance will create difficulty in determining which finance 
                                                        
61 Carolyn Swain, ‘Government Response to Encouraging Corporate Rescue (Legislative Update)’ (2010) 
2 CRI 82 
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satisfies this requirement62. However, if the company becomes insolvent, this 
priority matters. This great omission will continue to be a significant hurdle 
to the access of rescue finance63. 
 
Rescue Culture in the Commonwealth Caribbean [emphasis on 
Barbados64] 
 
Evidence of Rescue Culture?  
Any hope for Commonwealth Caribbean rescue culture is found in the 
proposal regime65. Modelled on the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
(R.S.C. , 1985, c. B-3), the initiation of this regime creates a wide moratorium 
for both secured and unsecured creditors. Here, secured creditors are 
required to give 10 days notice if they intended to enforce their security. This 
gives the debtor company ample time to appoint an out-of-court receiver at 
which time the 30-day moratorium automatically takes effect. This may be 
extended for a maximum of 6 months. The receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy, is 
required to assess the company’s financial standing and produce a proposal 
within the moratorium period. A majority, which must include two-thirds in 
value, is required to approve the proposal. If the debtors fail to comply with 
time or other requirements imposed by the Act or creditors reject the 
proposal, the company converts to liquidation.  
                                                        
62 Insolvency Service ‘Response by the Association of Business Recovery Professionals’ (June 2009) 
<http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/professional/Company_Rescue_R3_response.p
df> Last accessed July 2, 2013 
63 Geoffrey Yeowart, ‘UK restructuring moratorium: a useful option for company rescue’ (2010) 11 
JIBFL 657 
64 Across the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Barbadian provision shows ‘rescue culture’ potential. Other 
jurisdictions which have a similar proposal regime include St Vincent and the Grenadines and the 
proposed framework in Trinidad and Tobago 
65 See Barbados Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Sections 12 – 37  
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Priority for rescue financing? 
Similar to the United Kingdom regime, this Act fails to give ‘super priority’ for 
finance provided after the petition has been filed. However, the trustee in 
bankruptcy could negotiate to give security over unencumbered assets. At 
this stage in its corporate existence, it is highly unlikely that it has any such 
assets. 
 
 Opportunity Lost for Birth of Rescue Culture? Case Analysis: REDJet 
On October 16, 2010, having invested over USD 1M, AIRONE Ventures 
Holding Ltd (AVL) launched their airline, REDJet Limited, in Barbados, and by 
extension, the Caribbean region. Its goal was to facilitate regional travel with 
its attractive ‘USD $9.99 before tax’ fare structure. However, it faced many 
delays in applications for licences to fly across the region whilst having to 
defend allegations of an unsound business model. This claim was rebutted by 
its CEO who produced evidence to the contrary: low overhead costs through 
decisions not to invest in ‘flashy cars or extravagant offices [or] travel agency 
fees [but rather a focus on] employee productivity and flexibility’. The first 
flight from Barbados to Guyana (May 10, 2011) was the beginning of its short-
lived success as planes were grounded frequently due to technical issues. 
With claims that Caribbean Governments had failed to offer the support given 
to other regional airlines (LIAT and Caribbean Airlines) and international 
carrier (American Airlines) including financial assistance and subsidized fuel, 
and rejected appeals for state assistance; REDjet Limited suspended its 
operations on March 16, 2012 – 311 days after launch. Even if state assistance 
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was provided, this would be ad hoc given the absence of any state aid 
framework. 
 
Leaving many customers stranded at regional airports, immediately, it sought 
the courts’ protection [known as a moratorium or ‘stay of proceedings’] under 
section 41 of the Barbados Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). At this point, 
its woes had just begun as it was faced with claims of regional creditors. With 
one of its airplanes being flown out unknown to creditors, the Grantley 
Adams International Airport Inc. (Barbados) obtained an injunction for fees 
owed [regional airports were cumulatively owed just under USD 1M]. 
Presently, REDjet Limited is seeking the court’s approval of its creditor-
endorsed proposal to pay them 25 cents on every dollar owed [the minimum 
allowed under section 27 of the BIA]. 
 
Guided by a ‘creditor driven’ model of bankruptcy legislation, from the outset, 
only the interests of creditors were raised. The interests of employees, 
customers, future suppliers and ordinary citizens were irrelevant. Given that 
companies fail everyday, why does this failure matter? This collapse affected 
Barbados and the wider region, which includes Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, 
St Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica, as it resulted in unemployment, loss of revenue 
(through suppliers and airport landing fees) and an alleged decrease in 
regional travel due to high airfares stemming from absence of competition. 
There is statutory potential for the development of a rescue culture but when 
the ‘chips’ fall, how effective is it in facilitating rescue? This begs the question 
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as to whether this was an opportunity lost in the annals of time for regional 
jurisprudential practice to explore the ambit of this rescue culture. 
 
A comparison: US Chapter 11 vs UK’s Administration Regime66 vs 
Commonwealth Caribbean (Barbados) proposal regime 
“The availability of [priority for] further funding while in administration is 
perhaps one of the greatest shortcomings of the UK regime and brightest 
triumphs of Chapter 11.”67 This is evident from Table 1 below. Certainly, 
private banks and other lenders would be disinterested in providing their 
scarce finance on terms in these harsh economic times. It is clear that the 
United Kingdom and Barbadian regime have failed. Thus, one must turn to 
proposals that provide state-assisted/state-driven rescue financing.  
 
Table 1 – A comparison of US Chapter 11, UK Administration and 
Barbados Proposal Regime [modelled on Canadian legislation] 
 United States 
(Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code) 
United Kingdom 
(Administration 
under IA 1986 and EA 
2002) 
Commonwealth 
Caribbean – Barbados 
(Proposal regime 
under BIA 2002) 
Control Insider control – 
Debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) who formulates 
the plan 
 
 
 
 
Pro-debtor/Pro-
business 
 
Justified since company 
initiates the process by 
a voluntary petition; an 
acceptance that the 
company needs 
‘breathing space’ to 
work out its affairs 
 
External control – 
Administrator [an 
insolvency practitioner] 
appointed (in or out of 
court) to whom 
extensive power is 
given 
 
Pro-creditor 
External control – 
Trustee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pro- creditor 
                                                        
66 Though the administration regime (UK) is contrasted to Chp 11 (US), Alexandra Szekely ‘Chapter 11: 
one size fit all?’ (2008) 9 JIBFL 457 notes that the UK Company Voluntary Arrangements and Schemes 
of Arrangements are more similar to Chp 11 regime than administration 
67 Alexandra Szekely ‘Chapter 11: one size fit all?’ (2008) 9 JIBFL 457, 460 
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However, this DIP 
closely monitored by 
the court: imposing 
administrative burden 
not imposed in UK 
Mechanism to bind 
dissenting creditors 
Yes – Cram down 
mechanism 
 
This forces the 
reogranisation plan on 
a dissenting minority if 
accepted by two-thirds 
of that class. However, 
this is subject to a 
requirement that 
consent must be 
obtained from the 
creditors holding two-
thirds in value68 
No No 
Role of shareholders Yes 
 
This flows from a 
commitment to the 
entrepreneurial ethic 
and US-driven belief 
that financial troubles 
arise external to the 
company 
No  
 
Shareholders presumed 
to bear part of 
responsibility for 
company’s financial 
distress 
No  
  
Shareholders regarded 
as residual claimants, 
their voice has no 
weight 
Time Often regarded as too 
long – standstill 
operates for 120 days 
after filing (may be 
extended by the court 
is the company is large 
and the reorganisation 
is complex) + 60 days 
for approval from 
creditors and 
shareholders 
 
Average Chapter 11: a 
year and half – 
statutory 18 month 
deadline 
One year but may be 
extended by the court 
30 days but may be 
extended up to six 
months [Application 
must be made very 45 
days for an extension in 
which the court will 
determine whether 
significant process is 
being made] 
Super-priority 
accorded to rescue 
finance 
Yes 
 
Well-developed DIP 
financing sector  
* For details, see above 
No  
 
This is seen as 
significant loophole but 
stakeholders suggested 
that reform was 
unnecessary  
No 
 
Similar to UK regime in 
this respect 
 
  
Rescue-facilitating 
regime 
Only Chapter 11 A number of regimes: 
Schemes of 
arrangement: sections 
895 – 9 of the CA 2006, 
CVA under IA 1986 and 
administration 
Only proposal regime 
under the Act 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
                                                        
68 John Townsend, ‘Comparing UK and US business recue procedures: are Administration and Chapter 
11 perceived to be workable and affordable?’ (2007) 23 IL and P 66 
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IV Proposal on State Rescue Financing: Financial and Non-financial 
Measures  
 
A. Financial Measures 
 
 (i) Direct Measures: State Aid Framework 
 
There is a longstanding presumption that one of the roles of the state is job 
creation, preservation, and assisting financially distressed companies. Thus, 
in the face of distress, ‘financial refuge’ is sought in governments as the ‘public 
purse’ is presumed to be the ‘fattest’. However, before a proposal on state aid 
is made, this paper must determine whether this long-standing presumption 
should be disregarded. United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
emphasised that the role of the government is not to single out good and bad 
industries; rather, the state should make it easy for all industries. He further 
lamented, “governments do not create jobs, rather business do”69. In a free 
market economy, it is well accepted that any state intervention, which 
subverts normal operation of the market, must be justified. It is the writer’s 
belief that the existence of a state aid regime, which operates to intervene in 
the free market, is justified given the proper role of the state.  
 
The World Bank Global Financial Development Report 2013 (GFDR 2103) 
suggests that the role of the state is one of promoting competition and 
                                                        
69 David Cameron, ‘It is business, not the state, that creates jobs’ last accessed July 6, 2013 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2043971/David-Cameron-Business-creates-jobs-state--
confront-difficulties.html> 
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participation (particularly beyond banks to non-banks) and ensuring access 
and transparency70. This report appears to be hinting at a facilitative role: this 
is the proper role of the state. Under this umbrella of ‘facilitation’, the state 
should ensure that effective and efficient procedures pave the way for 
business success. This will include ease of access into rescue and rescue 
financing procedures. Freixas and Mayer suggest that the financial crisis has 
called for a re-casting of the role of the state as it suggested that the state’s 
role is a “provider of catastrophic insurance”71. In other words, intervention 
should be limited to the most exceptional circumstances. They suggest that all 
financial systems should have “adequate systems of management in place and 
ways of reorganizing themselves without having to call upon the state to 
intervene.”72  
 
It is noteworthy that the GFDR 2013 produces evidence supporting their 
proposition that direct state interventions worked in the short term but 
created “potential longer-term harmful effects” as the crisis subsided. Thus, it 
is accepted that there must be some rebalancing towards less direct state 
involvement. In this rebalancing, limited states resources, a direct result from 
the implementation of austerity measures, must be wisely invested and the 
risks posed by viewing the state as ‘a shelter in the time of storm’ must be 
analysed. These include the moral hazard [company favours risk-taking 
behaviour with expectation that government will provide bail-out if it faces 
                                                        
70 World Bank Global Financial Development Report, ‘Rethinking the Role of the State in Finance’ 11 
71 Xavier Friexas and Colin Mayer, ‘Banking, Finance and the Role of the State’, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Volume 27, Number 3, 2011, 397, 407 
72 Freixas and Mayer (n. 72) 407, See also Reinert ‘The Role of the State in Economic Growth’, Journal of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4/5, 1999, 268 - 326 
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financial distress] and distortion of competition [firms are unable to compete 
with the assisted firm]. 
 
Despite these risks, a state undertaking this facilitative role in the 21st century 
is met with a gamut of difficulties that include growing fiscal deficits crippling 
the state’s ability to provide finance and the rise of cross-border corporations 
increasing uncoordinated rescue attempts. These real challenges provide 
incentives for Caribbean states (among others) to adopt a regional state aid 
regime. It is unwise to leave access to finance and rescue mechanisms to the 
‘whims and fancies’ of present leaders or the political or social dictates of 
newly elected governments. Such a framework is absent in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region; with much haste, this issue must be 
addressed. Given the success of the European Union State Aid regime, 
guidance may be gleaned from it. 
 
What is the European Union State Aid regime? What are its foundations? 
According to article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the objective of the European Union is to set up an internal market. 
This objective is achieved, in part, through exclusive jurisdiction in 
competition law matters. This is bolstered by Protocol 27: the sound 
functioning of the internal market includes a component which ensures that 
competition is not distorted. Thus, the general principle, under Article 107 of 
TFEU (former Art 87 on Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)) 
is state aid in any form, in general, is incompatible with the internal market 
unless exempted. State aid refers to forms of assistance from a public body or 
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publicly funded body given to selected undertakings which has the potential 
to distort competition and affect trade between Member States (MS) of the 
European Union73. Thus, under article 108 TFEU, the Commission is tasked 
with the responsibility of controlling state aid. The general process is that MS 
must notify the Commission of the proposed aid instituting a standstill until 
the Commission has given authorisation. Procedure Regulation (659/99) 
defines unlawful state aid ‘unnotified aid’ and power is given to the 
Commission to mandate the claw back of that aid even if it results in the 
collapse of the company74. 
 
Four components must be satisfied to constitute state aid75: (i) It must be by, 
with or through state resources [this is not limited to cash but may include 
grants, interest rate debates, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation 
allowances, capital injections and tax exemptions76; (ii) It must favour a 
particular undertaking or the production of certain goods [Thus, aid given 
across a MS without discretion to industry or other factors, it not state aid but 
rather a general measure]; (iii) It distorts or threaten distorts competition 
and (iv) It affects intra-community trade. Elements for which authorisation is 
                                                        
73 DBIS, ‘State Aid’ (Publication, December 2012) 
74 DBIS, ‘State Aid: A Beginner’s Guide’ (Guidance Notes – June 2010) 
75 See Case 241/94, France v Commission (Kimberly Clark), [1996] E.C.R. I-3203: It is the effect and not 
the purpose of the state aid that is decisive 
76 DBIS, ‘A State Aid Guide – Guidance for state aid practitioners’ (June 2011) notes forms of state aid: 
State grants; interest rate or tax relief; tax credits; State guarantees (direct or indirect) or holdings; 
State provision of goods or services on preferential terms; direct subsidies; tax exemptions; preferential 
interest rates; guarantees of loans on especially favourable terms; acquisition of land or buildings either 
gratuitously or on favourable terms; Less obvious examples include: consultancy advice; advantages 
resulting from the activities of agencies for urban renewal; assistance to help companies invest in 
environmental projects; assistance to help a public enterprise prepare for privatisation; legislation to 
protect or guarantee market share; public private partnerships and contracts not open to competitive 
tendering 
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not required include: (i) De minimis regulation77: aid under €200,000 over a 
3 year fiscal period as it is treated as not having the capacity to affect intra-
community trade and (ii) General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER): range 
of pre-approved state aid areas that do not require individual approval, 
however, notification must be given. However, inapplicability of these created 
a void where the company seeking assistance was ‘in difficulty’. Thus, the 
Commission crafted temporary regulation to address this void: Community 
Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty78 
(hereafter referred to as ‘R&R firms in difficulty’). 
 
 
Under this temporary framework, three elements must be satisfied prior to 
receiving state aid: 
I. Does the proposed beneficiary qualify as a “firm in difficulty”? The 
Commission regards a firm in difficulty where it is unable, whether 
through its own resources or with funds it is able to obtain from 
owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which, without 
outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly 
condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term. In 
particular, a firm is regarded as being in difficulty where:  
(a) in the case of a limited liability company, where more than 
half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one 
                                                        
77 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 
and 88 of the Treaty of de minimis aid OJ L L 379/5 
78 Commission, ‘Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty’ 
(Communication): OJ 244, 01/10/2004 P. 0002 - 0017 
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quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 
months; 
(b) in the case of a company where at least some members have 
unlimited liability for the debt of the company, where more 
than half of its capital as shown in the company accounts has 
disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been 
lost over the preceding 12 months; or 
(c) whatever the type of company concerned, where it fulfils the 
criteria under its domestic law for being the subject of 
collective insolvency proceedings. 
 
II. Has the firm been in operation at least three years preceding the 
request for assistance? If no, assistance may not be given. 
 
III. Has the firm previously received rescue or restructuring aid? The 
general rule is ‘one time last time’. Repeat state intervention is not 
permitted as this would result in the state maintaining inefficient 
organisations. 
 
It should be noted that rescue and restructuring aids are two distinct 
mechanisms even though they may be combined. Apart from the three 
requirements above, to qualify as rescue aid, it must: 
o Consist of reversible liquidity help in the form of loan 
guarantees or loans bearing normal commercial interest rates 
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(and atleast comparable to the reference rates adopted by the 
Commission) 
o Be restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in business 
o Only operate for time need to formulate a restructuring plan: a 
maximum of 6 months 
o Be warranted on the grounds of social difficulties and have no 
impact in the industrial situation in other MS 
o Be accompanied, on notification, by an undertaking by the MS 
to communicate to the Commission a restructuring or 
liquidation plan or proof that the loan has been reimbursed or 
guarantee terminated, not longer than six months after granting 
the aid 
 
To qualify as restructuring aid: 
o A restructuring/recovery programme to restore viability in a 
reasonable time period must be submitted to the Commission 
o The company must implement the restructuring plan in full and 
observe all attached conditions 
o Aid is limited to the amount needed for the restructuring and 
the beneficiary company must contribute a substantial 
proportion of the restructuring costs – this ensures that 
companies have ‘skin in the game’79 [note that this requirement 
                                                        
79 European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies,  ‘State aid Crisis Rules for the Financial 
Sector and the Real Economy’, (Policy Department A - Economic and Scientific Policy: Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, June 2011): Since the largest burden falls on the taxpayer, it is recommended that 
assistance should only be given after private investors suffer substantial losses and credible attempts to 
attract capital on the market have failed 
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is applied flexibly to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
firms in assisted regions] 
o Strict monitoring and annual reporting is required 
o Compensatory measures are taken to avoid undue distortions 
of competition (eg appropriate reduction of capital) 
 
Though there were significantly fewer applications outside of the banking 
sector80, state aid was useful in stabilising companies during the recent 
financial crisis. Table 2 (below) shows that across MS generally similar forms 
of state assistance were implemented in response to the financial crisis.  
 
Table 2: National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial 
Crisis (Selected Member States) 
Source: National Rescue Measures in response to the current financial crisis - 
European Central Bank - Legal Working Paper Series - No 8 / July 2009 - by 
Ana Petrovic and Ralf Tutsch   
 
                                                        
80 Matt Evans, ‘I’m about to go insolvent and I am not a bank’ (2012) 6 CRI 231 
 
 State guarantee Recapitalisation  Acquisition  
of Risk 
Positions/ 
Impaired Assets 
State  
Loans 
Nationali-
sation 
United 
Kingdom/ 
Germany 
  
 
    X   
Greece 
/Spain 
  
 
  X   X 
France   
 
    X X 
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Even in the post-crisis period, EC approvals of state aid for rescue and 
restructuring (Table 3 below) is evidence of the critical role that rescue and 
restructuring state aids continue to pay outside of the banking sector. 
 
Table 3: Non-banking Rescue and Restructuring Aid Approvals 
Date of 
Adoption 
Member 
State 
Form of Aid Budget 
 
OB – Overall Budget 
 
AB – Annual Budget 
Duration 
(Period) 
12.1.2011 Poland Other form of tax 
advantage, Debt 
write off 
OB: PLN 30,80M Until 
31.12.2012 
15.6.2011 Poland Soft loan, Other 
forms of equity, 
Intervention 
OB: PLN 8,50M 15.6.2011 – 
31.12.2012 
8.2.2012 Poland Other forms of 
equity 
intervention 
OB: PLN 2,30M From 8.2.2012 
21.3.2012 Poland Direct grant OB: PLN 5,20M 1.10.2010 – 
31.12.2012 
11.7.2012 Poland Direct grant OB: PLN 1M 1.1.2012 – 
31.12.2014 
27.9.2012 Germany Soft loan OB: EUR 2M 
AB: EUR 1,50M 
15.10.2013 – 
31.12.2013 
4.10.2012 Austria Other forms of 
equity 
intervention 
OB: EUR 220M From 
1.12.2012 
19.10.2012 Austria Soft loan OB: EUR 4M 
AB: EUR 1,80M 
19.10.2012 – 
31.12.2014 
19.11.2012 Germany Interest subsidy, 
Guarantee, Debt 
write off, Soft 
loan 
OB: EUR 30M 
AB: EUR 15M 
1.1.2013 – 
31.12.2014 
14.             14.12.2012 Germany Guarantee OB: EUR 100M 
AB: EUR 100M 
Until 
31.12.2013 
18.2.2013 Italy Guarantee OB: EUR 24M 1.5.2013 – 
31.10.2013 
20.2.2013 Austria Direct grant, 
Other, Soft Loan 
OB: EUR 4M 
AB: EUR 1,80M 
20.2.2013 – 
31.12.2014 
21.2.2013 France Guarantee OB: EUR 18M No duration 
1.3.2013 Germany Soft loan OB: EUR 15M 
AB: EUR 2,50M 
1.10.2013 – 
30.9.2013 
6.3.2013 United 
Kingdom 
Other, Direct 
grant 
OB: GBP 0,19M 
AB: GBP 0,19M 
From 
29.8.2012 
15.3.2013 Italy Guarantee OB: EUR 25M 1.5.2013 – 
1.11.2013 
6.5.2013 Lithuania Debt write off OB: LTL 258M 2.7.2013 – 
31.12.2015 
 
Source: Author’s compilation of data from the Official Journal Publications of 
the EU (April – June 2013) 
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Despite its success one must necessarily consider whether state aid (for 
rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty) is the best mechanism or are 
there better-laced tools which may be used to facilitate corporate recovery? 
This determination is key given the Regulation’s temporary nature and the 
recent extension in September 2012 with consultation expected in spring of 
this year. OXERA suggests that there is a long-standing presumption that 
government aid saves a ‘considerable amount of jobs and activities that would 
otherwise disappear’. However, contrary to this belief, evidence about the 
impact of state aid intervention in jobs and activities compared with a 
counterfactual of no intervention, has been limited81. This flies in the face of a 
common justification of state intervention. Further, OXERA suggests (in an 
earlier work) that 77% of non-assisted firms, whether through acquisition or 
continuation, had survived three years after the onset of financial distress. 
This too strikes at the heart of state intervention82. 
 
In 2010, The European Commission invited MSs and stakeholder to provide 
feedback on their recent experience of rescue and restructuring in light of the 
recent economic crisis. The United Kingdom83 suggested that the threshold 
should be an insolvent ‘firm in difficulty’: pending insolvency is insufficient as 
this may be covered under the administration or Company Voluntary 
Arrangement (CVA) regimes. Further, since such assistance is highly 
distortive and a poor use of taxpayers’ money, the first resort for assistance 
                                                        
81 OXERA, ‘When the going gets tough: a closer look at financial distress and restructuring’ (Feb 2010) n 
82 OXERA, ‘Should aid be granted to companies in difficulty? A study of counterfactual scenarios in 
restructuring aid’ (December 2009)  
83 European Competition Commission, Consultation on the Review of Rescue and Restructuring aid 
Guidelines (Contribution: United Kingdom) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_restructuring_aid/uk_en.pdf> accessed July 6, 
2013 
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must be the shareholders: thus funds cannot be set aside for dividend 
payments. It produced evidence of successful applications of rescue aid in 
which state aid was granted to non-banking entities: “Modec (NN19/2009) 
and to LDV (NN41/2009) – in neither case was this followed by restructuring 
aid. Modec [was] able to repay the loans offered and the rescue aid for LDV 
was given to allow time for a buyer to be put in place. In the event a buyer 
was not found and LDV were allowed to go into insolvency and exit the 
market”84. Ultimately, it was firm in its belief that state aid should not be used 
to ‘prop up’ inefficient companies, rather, companies should be allowed to exit 
the market through normal exercise of bankruptcy and insolvency law. 
 
Despite the accolades given to this framework, it is critical that the 
Commission, in applying these provisions, create a balance between certainty 
and flexibility. The flexibility required is evident where states, crushed by 
financial pressures, provide assistance pending the Commission’s decision85. 
In May 2013, the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on ‘EU Guidelines 
on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty’ provided nine 
salient points which should guide reform86:  
1. State aid is useful if its purpose is to help structurally profitable 
firms to overcome a period of instability, protect jobs and 
preserve industrial knowhow, maintain the economic fabric of a 
                                                        
84 Matt Evans, ‘I’m about to go insolvent and I am not a bank’ (2012) 6 CRI 231 
85 Michael Reynolds, Sarah Macrory and Michelle Chowdhury 
‘EU Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Measures’ Fordham International Law 
Journal, 2011, Vol 33 Issue 6, Article 3 
86 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty 
(2013/C 139/04, May 17, 2013) 
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region, carry out public service tasks or preserve a competitive 
structure so as to avoid a situation of monopoly or oligopoly, as 
well as to allow firms that carry out an activity of strategic 
importance to the European Union to overcome temporary 
situations of global competitive stress 
2. Increased assistance through the European Commission inter-
service task force which will create a platform for co-
ordination, exchanges and negotiation between the Commission 
and stakeholders, particularly in areas of restructuring 
3. Establishment and maintenance of a public on-line database 
which allows for filing of comments by competitors who believe 
they will be adversely affected if the proposed beneficiary is 
given state aid  
4. Rejection of limitation of state aid to companies in formal 
insolvency proceedings as it is more effective and efficient to 
deal with enterprises in advance of collective proceedings [This 
was a strong request of UK in 2010 consultation] 
5. Proposal for extension of de minimis regulation to firms in 
difficulty with a guarantee of EUR 200 000 for SMEs and 500 
000 for other firms 
6. Maximum period for rescue aid measures extended: given the 
complexity in drafting a plan, it should have the capacity to be 
renewed for a further six months 
7. Contribution by the beneficiary should be reduced from a 
minimum of 40% for medium sized enterprises to minimum of 
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20% and in the case of large enterprises from a minimum of 
50% to a minimum of 30% 
8. In light of inflation, maximum amount of aid for combined  
rescue and restructuring aid set at EUR 10 million in 2007 
should be increased to EUR 15 million 
9. A call for the simplification of the rules, improvement of their 
practical implementing measures and speeding up or cutting 
back on procedures and a renewed focus on cases which have a 
substantial impact the internal market 
 
Standing alone, state aid may not be seen as the best mechanism to tackle the 
complexities which arise with rescue financing; however, when working in 
tandem with other measures (discussed below) or mechanisms outside the 
scope of this paper such as ban on dividends in periods of difficulty and 
constraints on executive pay, a sound rescue financing platform may be 
realised. 
 
Given the interconnectedness and dependency of the economies in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, the importance of a regional framework cannot be 
overemphasised. In the absence of a similarly constituted European Union, it 
is proposed that the operation of a regional state aid regime falls under the 
purview of the CARICOM Competition Commission established under Article 
171 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. When one considers the preamble 
and the general framework of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, it is built 
around the avoidance of the distortion of competition.  
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Though state aid presents essential tools implemented to assist enterprises in 
managing challenges brought by the development of regional marketplaces 
and globalisation, it would be unwise to transplant the EU framework, pitched 
in an unparalleled legal landscape, to the region with its unique 
jurisprudence. It is clear that future feasibility studies [which will include 
costs and benefits analysis87] are needed prior to implementation; however, 
three striking observations should be made: A need for balance between 
investment in corporate rescue and expected ‘benefits’; establishment of an 
oversight and supervisory committee and any finance given by state should 
be given through ‘stage financing’: release of funds is contingent on the 
attainment of specific targets set by the oversight committee and by extension 
the state. 
 
 (ii) Indirect Measures 
(a) Debt write-off or tax deferrals  
 
A close analysis of companies in distress will disclose that the state (whether 
through national insurance contributions or taxes) is one of the companies’ 
largest creditors.88 A framework allowing for state forgiveness of corporate 
debt89 may be manifested in a number of ways: complete debt write-off, 
                                                        
87 Abel Mateus, ‘The Current Financial Crisis and State Aid in the EU’, European Competition Journal, 
Volume 5, Number 1, April 2009, 1 – 18  
88 For example, Bajan Cleaning Enterprises (Barbados) Ltd owed USD 5 million to state agencies 
89 The Breedon Review, Boosting Finance Options for Businesses, (Commissioned by the Department of 
Business, Innovation & Skills – 2012, Industry Taskforce to examine this question: how do we re-shape 
the finance landscape to make it serve better the needs of British 
businesses?)<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/enterprise/docs/B/12-668-boosting-finance-
options-for-business.pdf> last accessed July 3, 2013. However, the Government, in their response 
(‘Boosting Finance Options for Businesses – Government Response to Industry-led Taskforce’) , noted 
the risks that arise from such incentivising investment in small companies. Further, the proposed 
changes would complicate the existing set-up and undermine its core purpose of providing a relatively 
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partial debt write-off, partial debt write-offs combined with tax deferrals, 
deferrals alone or rate relief. However, such a framework must be carefully 
crafted and monitored to minimise abuse. Condition which should be 
imposed includes evidence of efforts to repay state debt and that the debt 
should be outstanding for no more than two years or greater than a stipulated 
maximum. 
 
(b) Concessions and incentives for financial institutions ‘active’ in corporate 
rescue initiatives 
Within the last decade, corporate access to rescue finance has been affected 
by the fragmentation of debt and global financial crisis. If privately run 
financial institutions are to disburse their scarce resources, some incentive 
must be given. One proposal is tax incentives to financing institutions that 
provide ‘first time financing’ to troubled companies up to a specified 
maximum. The tax credit may be linked to the amount of financing. No credits 
should be given unless the institution has carried out due diligence checks to 
ensure that the company’s business model is viable and when combined with 
the proposed finance will place it on a path to recovery. 
 
Another incentive that the state may provide to financial institutions is 
guaranteeing loans on the international financial market or provision of 
cheaper finance. The latter may be modelled on the United Kingdom National 
Loan Guarantee Scheme  (NLGS), launched in March 2012. Under the NLGS, 
                                                                                                                                                        
simple vehicle which encourages people to save.  
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/enterprise/docs/B/12-669-boosting-finance-options-
government-response.pdf> last accessed July 3, 2013 
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up to £20 billion of cheaper funding is made available to banks under a 
government guarantee with a two-year window. Banks will be expected to 
pass on this benefit to smaller businesses in the form of reduced interest 
rates. Another scheme is the Funding for Lending Scheme90: according to the 
Market Notice published by the Bank of England (BoE), “this is designed to 
incentivize banks and building societies to boost their lending to UK 
households and non-financial companies. [It] will provide funding to banks 
and building societies for an extended period, at below current market rates, 
with both the price and quantity of the funding provided linked to their 
performance in lending to the UK non-financial sector”91.  
 
This increased access to finance at a lower rate should reduce the bank’s 
funding costs thus encouraging lending which will once again oil the 
‘economic wheels’ promoting growth. Though these funds do not cater to a 
firm in difficulty and were geared (in part) to small-and-medium enterprises 
(SMEs), the operation of these provide guidance on the establishment of 
schemes which provide cheaper finance to companies. 
 
Though the effect of such schemes would take some time to prove their 
worth, the announcement of the introduction of such schemes was met with 
                                                        
90 Jennifer Thompson and Jim Pickard ‘Funding for Lending still to prove itself’ (Financial Times, April 
21, 2013) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4619906e-aa9f-11e2-9a38-00144feabdc0.html> July 6, 
2013 
91 Bank of England, ‘Market Notice – Funding for Lending Scheme’ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice120713.pdf> accessed 13 July 
2012 
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‘an improvement in credit conditions, with loan rates falling’92 Paul Tucker, 
Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at The Bank of England, suggested 
that though the FLS was no ‘silver bullet’, the greater than expected growth in 
the economy was evidence that though there was a long way to go, progress 
was still being made93. This has resulted in the extension of the scheme for a 
further year until the end of January 2015. This framework should also 
include an invitation for proposals by the private banking sector on the 
removal of barriers preventing access to rescue finance for troubled 
companies. 
 
B. Non-financial Measures 
 
 (i) Direct Measures: Three-Prong Approach to Law reform 
There are areas in which regional legal frameworks may be reformed to 
strengthen the rescue culture and facilitate access and provision of rescue 
financing: 
(a) Fundamental review of bankruptcy law 
 The Barbados Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, similar to other pieces of 
insolvency legislation across the region, is guided by an outdated vision of 
bankruptcy law: creditor wealth maximization. Thus, the rights and needs of 
its creditors guide all of the statutory decisions relevant to the 
insolvency/bankruptcy of a company. Inspired by the law and economics 
                                                        
92 Bank of England, ‘News Release: Bank of England and HM Treasury – Funding for Lending Scheme: 
2012 Q4 usage and lending data’ (March 4, 2013) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/044.aspx> accessed July 6, 2013 
93 Coreena Ford, ‘Reason for hope – Bank of England Deputy Director: Paul Tucker’ 
<http://www.thejournal.co.uk/business/business-news/reason-hope---bank-england-4392132> last 
accessed, July 3, 2013 
 42 
movement, the creditor wealth maximization, as posited by Jackson94and 
later Jackson and Scott95 endorse a ‘common pool philosophy’. In summary, 
the sole goal of bankruptcy law should be the maximization and co-ordination 
of creditor returns, leaving creditors’ pre-insolvency rights intact and 
hindering re-distribution efforts.  
 
In the 21st century, the model on which bankruptcy laws are based is myopic. 
Regional Governments should amend their legislation to reflect current 
thinking underpin by a ‘stakeholder-model’, similar to the UK model. As seen 
with the REDjet (case study above), only the interests of creditors were 
represented in negotiations though the effects were widespread. 
 
As suggested by Warren96 and Korobkin97, bankruptcy should be guided by 
the needs of a range of stakeholders simply because bankruptcy creates a 
ripple effect; it does not impact creditors alone. In all cases, bankruptcy 
impacts employees, suppliers, governments and the ordinary citizen; thus, 
rescue should, where possible, play a critical role. Warren noted that some of 
the relevant, but not determinative, questions which should arise in 
bankruptcy include who may be hurt by business failure, whether the hurt 
can be avoided and at what cost, who is helped by failure and whether the aid 
to those helped offsets the injury to those hurt: all rescue-focussed. It is well 
                                                        
94 Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press, 1986) 
95 Jackson and Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’, [1989] 75(2) Va. 
L. Rev. 155 - 204 
96  Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ in Bhanderi and Weiss (eds) 
Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
97 Professor Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 
717. Reference may also be made to his other works: ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations 
of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas Law Review 541; ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy 
Debates’ (1996) 82 Iowa Law Review 75 
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accepted that this approach may affect the individual creditor’s freedom and 
may even result in redistribution; however, it is necessary to accept the 
interdependency between individuals and businesses and, further, the failure 
of one business may create ripple effects in the business community. This 
should drive legislators to reform. 
 
(b) Super-priority for rescue financing 
As discussed above, super-priority is one of the mechanisms, which could 
resuscitate the giving of financial assistance by the private sector to, 
distressed companies in this depressed economic environment. However, this 
mechanism must balance certainty and predictability [for those who provide 
finance in the pre-distress period] with fairness. Such a framework should 
include (i) No state priority - Super-priority should exclude any finance 
provided by the state or a state-funded body, (ii) Thresholds [relevant to the 
size of the company and relevant industry] must be substantial to reduce 
possible abuse and (iii) Priority only relates to the funds disbursed in the 
distress period and thus exclude priority for any funds provided in the pre-
distress period 
 
(c) Legislation should be supplemented by Guides or Statement of Principles 
and/or Best Practices:  
Statement of Principles and/or Best Practices are not innovative but have 
been successfully implemented and used across industries for decades. Such 
guides are critical in bolstering existing legislative structures. These ensure 
consistency in ‘insolvency circles’, serve as educational guides [including 
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awareness of proper entry and exit and the scope of legislative procedures], 
present legislation in simple and practical terms, reduce costs due to 
avoidable ‘mistakes’, enlighten creditors about their rights, encourage 
corporate activism where necessary and guide new entrants to corporate 
world.  
 
The United Kingdom’s ‘R3 – The Ostrich Guide to Business Survival’ is one 
successful example: this guide discusses the existing rescue culture, 
enlightens creditors and informs directors or owners of businesses in crisis of 
their rights and responsibilities. There are numerous internationally 
recognised guides that provide instruction on best practices for informal 
workouts. These include the INSOL International Statement of Principles for a 
Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts (October 2000), World Bank 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
Systems (April 2001) and Asian Bankers' Association Informal Workout 
Guidelines – Promoting Corporate Restructuring in Asia (October 2005). This 
is key given the upsurge of informal workouts in the face of the corporate 
distress.  
 
Principle 8 of the INSOL International Statement of Principles which discusses 
access to funding and priority is critical to our discussion and shows the 
potential interplay between statement of principles and existing legislative 
structures: “If additional funding is provided during the Standstill Period or 
under any rescue or restructuring proposals, the repayment of such 
additional funding should, so far as practicable, be accorded priority status as 
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compared to other indebtedness or claims of relevant creditors.”98 As 
identified above, neither the UK nor the Commonwealth Caribbean legislation 
provide for access or priority of rescue funding. However, the 
adoption/acceptance of statement of principle can fill the void presented by 
existing legislative structures or can act as pre-cursor to legislation where 
governments are timid to presently act in this regard. 
 
 (ii) Indirect Measures: General education, training and assistance 
A government unit tasked with the provision of general education, training 
and assistance (GETA) on rescue [prevention and legislative framework] and 
its financing would bolter existing mechanisms geared at assisting distressed 
enterprises. This unit may operate through collaboration between the 
Ministry of Finance and/or the Attorney-General’s office. On the ‘general 
education’ platform, GETA, through public education, will seek to remove the 
stigma attached to companies involved in insolvency procedures. This may be 
achieved by ‘retraining’ the minds of the public about the reasons for 
corporate failure which in many cases are often not fraud related. Such public 
education programmes have been successful in Germany through their 
‘Restart’ Programme which gives a second chance to honest entrepreneurs 
who experienced and learned from business failure.  
 
On the ‘training’ platform, free public awareness lectures, conferences and 
workshops will consider key areas including the operation of insolvency 
legislation and supporting frameworks. Provision should also be made for 
                                                        
98 INSOL International Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts 
(October 2000) 33 
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sessions where business owners are invited to give feedback on the operation 
of insolvency frameworks. This training should be mandatory for all 
businesses that receive state assistance, whether directly or indirectly. On the 
‘assistance’ platform, a range of resources [such as financial planning] and 
psychological support [through networking with other business owners] 
should be provided. 
 
However, these programmes must be attractive – both to business owners 
and prospective business owners – and flexible. This flexibility is best 
orchestrated through distance-learning conferences where videos are web-
accessible thus reducing cost and increasing convenience and accessibility. 
 
Conclusion 
Winston Churchill is oft remembered for saying “One ought never to turn 
one’s back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, 
you will double the danger. But if you meet it promptly and without flinching, 
you will reduce the danger by half. Never run away from anything. Never!” 
This advice is even more fitting in the face of the global financial crisis. The 
legislative forefathers of the United States Chapter 11 were given birth 
through the pain of the Great Depression of the 1930’s. Likewise, it is hoped 
that the financial turmoil of 2008 – 9 has inflicted such ‘pain’ on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean that it, too, will be driven into action; thus, 
bringing forth a ‘reformed child’: ‘an active Commonwealth Caribbean rescue 
culture’ with provision for priority and access to rescue financing. It is well 
accepted that recession has played a major role in reducing the state’s 
 47 
capacity to assist troubled companies. Thus, the state must play a facilitative 
role where private sector driven financing is incentivised. It is strongly 
believed that these recommendations, primarily the provision of a state aid 
framework, can serve as a turning point for access to finance for troubled 
enterprises both in the Commonwealth Caribbean region and beyond. All 
things considered, it is humbly, yet emphatically proposed, that these be 
incorporated into regional legislation. 
